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-IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY,LOHlcL .:.l1 ,•, :,·, 3' i-, I · j 
CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator 
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 











CASE NO. 3123z°2·; l 
JUDGE RO:\ALD SUSTER 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT 
STATE OF OHIO FOR 
LIMITING I"\'STRUCTION 
Now comes Defendant State of Ohio who, pursuant to Evid. R. 105, moves this 
Court to provide a limiting instruction at the commencement of proceeding this day as to 
the limited purpose for which the evidence regarding the conviction of Richard Eberling for 
the murder of Ethel Durkin has been admitted. 
Evid. R. 105 reads as follows: 
When evidence which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible 
... for another purpose, the court, upon request of a party, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
The language of the rule is mandatory. Evid. R. 105 serves as a safeguard to 
attempt to avoid confusion and undue prejudice to a party when "other acts" evidence is 
introduced for a limited purpose under Evid. R. 404(B), despite the prohibition against its 
introduction as "propensity" evidence. 
The operation of the Evid R. 105 was explained in State v. Valentine (Ohio App.2 
Dist. 1992), Case No. 13192, unreported (attached). There, the Court explained: 
--
A part is entitled under the Rule to a limiting instruction directed to the 
jury whenever evidence might be misapplied by the jury in reaching its 
verdict. Professor Weissenberger has commented that, "the Rule imposes 
mandatory duty upon the court to issue the instruction upon such a 
request." Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence, Vol. 1, Section 105 .2. 
The unfair prejudice inherent in evidence of other wrongdoing, 
particularly evidence of a prior criminal conviction, is that a jury will infer 
from it a propensity of the accused to commit the crime charged. That, 
clear'ly, is an improper inference .... 
On February 12, 2000, this Court entered an order regarding "other acts" of Richard 
Eberling. This Court ordered, " ... no mention shall be made of these 'other acts' without 
the prior approval of the court." 
The State of Ohio has been prejudiced by the introduction of the fact that Eberling 
has been convicted of another murder. The jury should be instructed that the re is no 
connection to be made between the murder of Marilyn Sheppard and the murder of Ethel 
Durkin and that Eberling's conviction is not evidence that he killed Marilyn Sheppard. 
The State of Ohio's proposed limited instruction is attached. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
Of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
KATHLEEN A:-'MARTIN (0040017) 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
--
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Motion of Defendant, State of Ohio, for Limiting 
Instruction was sent by ordinary United States Mail, postage prepaid, to Terry H. Gilbert, 
1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, and also via facsimile transmission to Terry 
H. Gilbert at (216) 621-0427, this 24th day of February, 2000. 
~~#~ 
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017) 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED LI.MITING INSTURCTION 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, yesterday I allowed testimony that Richard Eberling was 
convicted in 1989 of the murder of Ethel Durkin. That crime occurred in 1984, nearly 30 
years after the murder of Marilyn Sheppard. 
I 
I permitted that testimony for the limited purpose of allowing Kathie Dyal to explain why, 
according to her, she waited so long to come forward to report the conversation she says 
she had with Richard Eberling regarding Marilyn Sheppard. 
I instruct you that the fact that Eberling was convicted of that other crime is not evidence 
that Richard Eberling killed Marilyn Sheppard. I advise you that you may not make any 
-
conclusion or draw any inference that the murder of Ethel Durkin is in any way related to 
murder of Marilyn Sheppard 30 years earlier. 
1992 WL 137101, State v. Valentine, (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1992) 
*137101 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
,..._ REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
-
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
ST ATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
.... 
Patrick VALENTINE, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 13192. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, 
Montgomery County. 
June 19, 1992. 
Lorine M. Reid, Asst. Pros. Atty., Dayton, for 
plaimiff-appellee. 
David L. Hall, Dayton, for defendant-appellant. 
OPINION 
GRADY, Judge. 
**l On November 4, 1991, Patrick Valentine was 
convicted of Aggravated Trafficking in Cocaine, in 
violation of R.C. 2925.03(C)(l). Previously, on May 
16, 1990, Valentine had been convicted of Aggravated 
Drug Trafficking, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(l). 
Pursuant to 2925.03(C)(l), the prior conviction 
elevated the subsequent offense from a third degree 
felony to a second degree felony. 
Valentine argues that the trial court erred in 
permitting evidence of his prior conviction to be 
presented to the jury, or, in the alternative, in failing 
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding 
the prior conviction. Valentine also argues that he 
was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. 
We find that the trial court erred in failing to give 
the jury a cautionary instruction requested by 
Valentine, which was pertinent to the issues and a 
correct statement of the law. The conviction will be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
On August 28, 1991 the Dayton Police Department 
conducted a "sting" operation along a portion of 
Highview Avenue. Detective Mauch, dressed in 
street clothes, drove through the area several times in 
an unmarked car. Mauch was wired so that any 
- transactions could be recorded and monitored by other 
detectives. Mauch described several individuals, 
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including Valentine, over the wire. On his first pass 
by Valentine the two men made eye contact. On the 
second pass Mauch stopped his car. Valentine 
approached Mauch and asked what he was "looking 
for". Mauch replied that he wanted a "twenty dollar 
rock" of crack cocaine. 
Valentine got into Mauch's car and the two rode 
about for several minutes. Valentine eventually 
handed Mauch a rock of crack cocaine and Mauch 
offered Valentine a twenty dollar bill. Valentine told 
Mauch to lay the money on the ground and drive 
av,·ay. Mauch did so, and through his rear view 
mirror saw Valentine pick up the money. As Mauch 
drove away he made a radio report of the events to the 
other detectives on the team. 
About five minutes later other police officers entered 
the area and, based on the information from Mauch, 
approached Valentine and several other men and 
asked them for identification. They detained 
Valentine and patted him down. The pat down 
produced a crack pipe. Valentine was arrested, 
searched more thoroughly, and taken to jail. 
Valentine was charged with Aggravated Trafficking, 
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(C)(l). He was found 
guilty and sentenced to four to fifteen years 
incarceration. 
Valentine has filed a timely notice of appeal. He 
presents three assignments of error. 
II 
Appellant's first assignment of error, presented in 
the form of a question, states: 
IS THE PRIOR CONVICTION FOR (sic) 
LANGUAGE OF O.R.C. 2925.03(C)(l) AN 
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED 
UNDER 2925.03(A)(l)? 
R.C. 2925.03 provides: 
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the 
following: 
(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance in an 
amount less than the minimum bulk amount; 
* * * 
* * * 
**2 (C) If the drug involved is any compound, 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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mixture, preparation, or substance included in 
schedule I, with the exception of marihuana, or in 




(1) Where the offender has violated division (A)(l) 
of this section, aggravated trafficking is a felony of 
the third degree, except that, if the offender ... has 
previously been convicted of a felony drug abuse 
offense, aggravated trafficking is a felony of the 
second degree. (Emphasis supplied). 
I 
Valentine argues that his prior conviction for 
aggravated trafficking is not an element of the offense 
with which he was charged but is, rather, a penalty 
enhancement. For this reason, Valentine argues, 
evidence of the prior conviction should not have been 
presented to the jury, but should have been considered 
only by the judge for sentencing purposes. 
As this court stated recently in State v. Harowski 
(September 20, 1991), Mont.App. No. 12232, 
unreported: 
The issue of when a prior offense is a necessary 
element of a subsequent offense was clearly resolved 
by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Allen (1987), 
29 Ohio St.3d 53. In Allen, the court examined the 
precedent cases of State v. Gordon (1971), 28 Ohio 
St.2d 45 and State v. Henderson (1979), 58 Ohio 
St. 2d 171 and reaffirmed their holdings that where a 
prior conviction transforms the offense to be tried by 
increasing its degree, the prior conviction is an 
essential element which must be pied and proved by 
the State. The court further held that this 
requirement is limited to those cases in which the 
prior conviction elevates the degree of the 
subsequent offense, and does not apply in cases in 
which the prior conviction merely enhances the 
penalty for the subsequent offense. 
In order to determine whether (Appellant's) prior 
drug conviction elevated the degree of the drug 
trafficking offense( ) in question, we need only turn 
to the statute under which (Appellant) was charged. 
Revised Code 2925.03(C)(l) states: 'Where the 
offender has violated division (A)(!) of this section, 
aggravated trafficking is a felony of the third degree, 
and if the offender has previously been convicted of 
a felony drug abuse offense, aggravated trafficking is 
a felony of the second degree.' Thus, (Appellant's) 
prior drug conviction would, under this statute, 
elevate his subsequent offense( ) from (a) felon(y) of 
the third degree to (a) felon(y) of the second degree. 
This resulting transformation, according to Allen, 
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mandated that the prior conviction be pied and 
proven by the State as an element of the subsequent 
offense(). 
In accordance with the language of R.C. 
2925.03(C)(l) and the rule of Harowski, we find that 
the trial court did not err in determining that 
Valentine's prior drug conviction was an element of 
the charge he faced at trial. 
The first assignment of error is overruled. 
III 
Appellant's second assignment of error states: 
**3 WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED 
IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO RECEIVE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CONVICTION? 
Valentine makes several distinct arguments under 
this assignment of error. He first argues that, even 
assuming the prior conviction is an element of the 
offense charged, the trial court erred by submitting 
evidence of the prior conviction to the jury. We do 
not agree. The jury was required to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Valentine had previously been 
convicted of Aggravated Trafficking. Evidence must 
be presented to the jury for that purpose and the trial 
court did not err in admitting such evidence. 
Valentine also argues that a Termination Entry was 
not competent to prove the prior conviction and that it 
should not have been admitted in evidence. He 
contends that a "certified judgment entry" is required 
to prove a prior conviction, pursuant to R.C. 
2941.142. However, that statute concerns proof of 
prior conv1ct1ons for purposes of penalty 
enhancement. Its requirements are not applicable to 
proof of an element of the offense. Furthermore, the 
use of a certified judgment entry to show a prior 
conviction is permissive, not mandatory, under R.C. 
2941.142. Its use was proper here. 
Valentine's last argument under this assignment is 
that the trial court erred in declining to give a 
cautionary or limiting instruction to the jury 
concerning evidence of his prior offense. Valentine 
had requested the following instruction: 
Evidence has been presented that Patrick Valentine 
was previously convicted of a felony drug abuse 
offense. That evidence is not proof that Patrick 
Valentine sold "crack" cocaine on August 28, 1911. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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You must make no inference that Patrick Valentine 
committed the offense with which he is presently 
charged based upon his prior conviction. 
Every criminal defendant is "entitled to a fair trial, 
and a requisite part of that fair trial is to have a fairly 
instructed jury." State v. Nelson (1973), 36 Ohio 
St.2d 79, 85. Crim.R. 30(B) sets forth the procedure 
for delivering cautionary instructions to the jury: 
At the commencement and during the course of the 
trial, the court may give the jury cautionary and 
other instructions of law relating to trial procedure, 
credibility and weight of the evidence, and the duty 
and function of the jury and may acquaint the jury 
generally with the nature of the case. 
Action by the trial court pursuant to Crim.R. 30(B) 
is discretionary and should not be disturbed on review 
unless the court abuses its discretion. Stare v. Frost 
(1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 320. In a criminal context, 
an abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of 
law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful. Stare v. Adams 
(1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151. 
The scope of the trial court's discretion under 
Crim. R. 30(B) is substantially curtailed when the 
requested cautionary instruction concerns not 
procedure, the regularity and validity of which is 
supported by a rebuttable presumption, but, instead, 
concerns an issue of evidence. Evid.R. 105 provides: 
**4 When evidence which is admissible as to one 
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to 
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the 
court, upon request of a party, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly. 
The Staff Note to Rule 105 observes that it has a 
close relationship to Evid.R. 403, which permits 
exclusion of otherwise competent evidence "if to 
admit the evidence would cause the 'dangers of unfair 
prejudice.' " Evid.R. 105 does not contemplate 
exclusion of evidence. Here, evidence of the 
Appellant's prior conviction could not excluded as it 
was required to prove an element of the offense 
alleged. However, a proper cautionary instruction 
could be given limiting the jury's consideration of the 
prior conviction. 
A party is entitled under the Rule to a limiting 
instruction directed to the jury whenever evidence 
might be misapplied by the jury in reaching its 
verdict. Professor Weissenberger has commented 
that, "the Rule imposes mandatory duty upon the court 
to issue the instruction upon such a request." 
Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence, Vol. 1, Section 
105.2. 
The unfair prejudice inherent in evidence of other 
wrongdoing, particularly evidence of a prior criminal 
conviction, is that a jury will infer from it a 
propensity of the accused to commit the crime 
charged. That, clearly, is an improper inference as it 
is inconsistent with the right of the accused to a fair 
trial on those charges. An accused who requests an 
instruction against such an inference is entitled to have 
it. If "the requested instructions contain a correct, 
pertinent statement of the law and are appropriate to 
the facts they must be included, at least in substance, 
in the court's charge to the jury." State v. t•:etson, 
supra. Cincinnati v. Epperson (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 
59. 
The instruction requested by Defendant-Appellant 
Valentine is appropriate to the facts of the case and is 
a correct and pertinent statement of the law. Each 
element of the offense charged must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The jury may make reasonable 
inferences from the evidence before it. However, the 
functional elements of the alleged crime, a sale of 
crack cocaine on August 28, 1991, are not directly 
proved by the fact of a prior conviction, and no 
reasonable inference can be drawn from the prior 
conviction to prove the functional elements 
circumstantially. Any inference that the accused 
committed those functional elements or acts out of a 
propensity to commit crime is an unreasonable 
inference that denies the accused his right to a fair 
trial on the discrete offense charged. Therefore, a 
cautionary instruction to the jury that they may not 
make such an inference is warranted, and is mandated 
by Evid.R. 105 if requested. 
The particular instruction requested is, perhaps, 
overly broad in cautioning that the jury may not 
"infer" commission of the charged crime from the 
prior conviction. The prior conviction is an element 
of the crime charged, so that inference is proper. 
However, the purpose of the cautionary instruction 
may be met by revising the third sentence to state: 
"You must make no inference that Patrick Valentine 
sold crack cocaine on August 28, 1991, based upon 
his prior conviction." Alternatively, the third 
sentence may be omitted to preserve the meaning and 
value of the instruction. On these facts, and in view 
of the extreme prejudice resulting from evidence of 
the prior conviction, we find that the trial coun erred 
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when it refused to give the requested instruction, at 
least in substance. 
**5 An error may be harmless if other evidence of 
guilt is so overwhelming that guilt may yet be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot find the other 
evidence of guilt overwhelming in this case. The 
alleged sale was a one-on-one transaction. Other 
officers heard parts by radio, but the transmission was 
interrupted and incomplete. The Defendant was found 
after arrest to have a "crack pipe", which Officer 
Mauch testified he saw during the sale transaction. 
While that evidence supports Mauch's credibility, it 
does not prove the alleged sale of cocaine. The 
evidence, while compelling, is not such that we can 
find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To the extent it argues that the requested jury 
instruction regarding Valentine's prior conviction was 
required, Appellant's second assignment of error is 
sustained. 
IV 
Appellant's third assignment of error states: 
WHETHER DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE 
PREJUDICED DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
Valentine argues that three specific actions of trial 
counsel amounted to ineffective assistance. To 
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
criminal defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient and (2) that counsel's 
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. State v. 
Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391; Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668. 
Valentine first argues that his trial counsel should 
have filed a motion to suppress evidence of the crack 
pipe found on him when he was "patted down" by 
officers. He relies on Terry v. Ohio ( 1968), 392 U.S. 
l, which requires a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity and a belief that the 
suspect may be armed and a danger to the officer as a 
prerequisite to the "pat down". Valentine argues that 
the officers who searched him had no knowledge or 
basis to suspect him of criminal activity or that he was 
dangerous. The State argues that the officers relied 
on information from Officer Mauch concerning the 
sale transaction, and that the "investigative stop" of 
Valentine and several other men was simply a 
pretextual means to take Valentine into custody for the 
trafficking offense without alerting other subjects of 
the existence of the "sting" operation. Apparently, 
such encounters are not out of the ordinary events in 
this high crime area. 
Valentine's reliance on Terry v. Ohio. supra, is 
misplaced. The search of Valentine was not a "pat 
down" pursuant to a Terry stop. It was a search 
incident to his arrest. Valentine was stopped and 
searched based on evidence that he was the person 
who had a few minutes earlier sold crack cocaine to 
Detective Mauch. Valentine had been identified by 
Detective Mauch over his wire and by radio; other 
officers then stopped and arrested him. Information 
obtained by officers engaged in a common 
investigation may be used by one of them as probable 
cause for an arrest. State v. Henderson (1990), 51 
Ohio St.3d 54. A search incident to a lawful arrest 
is, of course. proper. Stare v. Kuns (October 2, 
1990), Mont.App. No. 11823, unreported; Chime! v. 
California (1969), 395 U.S. 752. on the argument 
presented, we conclude that trial counsel was not 
deficient in his representation because he did not file a 
motion to suppress. 
**6. Second, Valentine argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he was unprepared for cross-
examination of Detective Mauch. He first claims that 
trial counsel failed to move to strike after a question 
calling for hearsay was objected to but the answer \vas 
given. Valentine cites to page 18 of the Transcript, 
wherein Officer Mauch was asked whether in his 
experience marked money given to a subject is 
sometimes not found on him after arrest. An 
objection was made and sustained, but Mauch 
answered, "Yes". It was not hearsay, however, and 
Valentine has not demonstrated how the ansv.;er could 
have prejudiced his case. 
Valentine also cites pages 34 and 38 of the 
transcript. He makes no attempt to elucidate for this 
court, however, any failures trial counsel's 
performance at these points, other than to state 
generally that failure to prepa:e for cross examination 
and failure to object to hearsay testimony amounts to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. No hearsay 
evidence was given at either of these passages of the 
transcript. Again, the record does not demonstrate 
that trial counsel was unprepared for cross 
examination. 
Valentine also asserts that trial counsel failed to 
move for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 at the close 
of the State's evidence. A motion for acquittal is not 
required. There is no basis in the record from which 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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to conclude that a motion would have resulted in an 
acquittal. 





Having sustained Appellant's second assignment of 
error upon a finding that the trial court erred in failing 
to give a requested jury instruction, and because we 
cannot find that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction will be 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
FAIN, P.J., and WOLFF, J., concur. 
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